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ABSTRACT 
As a moderate North African Arab state, Morocco has ratified preferential free 
trade agreements with both the EU and the USA. However, the potential importance 
of improved agro-food market access with the EU has been largely ignored in 
Morocco-EU Association Agreement (MEAA). Indeed, in comparison with the depth 
of the agro-food reforms in the Morroco-US agreement, the MEAA is largely 
incomplete. Accordingly, as a first objective we employ a modified computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the potential for further long run trade and 
growth in Morocco through agro-food tariff abolition. Moreover, we investigate 
whether there is an economic incentive for such an EU countermovement to restore 
competitive parity with the US. As a further aim, we examine the trade inhibiting 
implications of non-tariff barrier (NTB) trade costs (e.g., red tape, licensing laws etc.), 
which have hitherto largely escaped reform. Thus, we estimate NTB trade cost tariff 
equivalents (TEs) employing a theoretically consistent gravity specification. TEs are 
implemented into our CGE model to measure the trade and growth impacts from NTB 
removal in agro-food and across all Moroccan-EU trade. Whilst agro-food 
liberalisation yields disappointing results for Morocco, the potential for development 
led policies through elimination of NTBs is highly appealing. 
 
Keywords: Morocco; Agro-Food Trade; NTB Trade Costs; Computable General 
Equilibrium; Gravity Modelling. 
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Getting the Most from the Euro-Med Agreement:  
A Moroccan Perspective. 
 
1. Introduction 
After many years of inward looking economic policies, Morocco is embracing 
market orientated export led growth through simultaneous regional and preferential free 
trade agreements (PFTAs).1 In addition to the Arab Free Trade Area (AFTA),2 Morocco 
has bilateral trade liberalisation commitments with countries in North Africa (Algeria, 
Guinea, Mauritania), the Middle East (Iraq, Libya and Turkey), the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and its principal trading relation, the European Union (EU).3 
In the case of the latter, trade relations are under the auspices of the ‘Morocco-EU 
Association Agreement’ (MEAA) as part of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which 
involves a series of all encompassing bilateral co-operation agreements between the EU 
and the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).4 Implemented in 2000, 
the MEAA promises free trade in industrial products by 2012, although it has been 
noted (Alvarez-Coque, 2002) that the majority of trade covered in this agreement 
already has favourable access conditions from previous accords,5 while progress in 
services, agriculture and investment is partial at best.  
As a moderate Arab state Morocco also enjoys close ties with the United States 
(US). In return for supporting the US led coalition in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of 
                                                 
1 PTFAs are permitted through GATT article XXIV as an exception to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
principle. 
2 Morocco along with ten other Arab states signed the AFTA in 1998. AFTA is committed to the gradual 
elimination of tariffs (over ten years) on the majority of trade between Arab nations.  
3 The EU sponsored free trade area initiative (the ‘Agadir Agreement’) between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia also symbolises Morocco’s advanced relations with the EU in creating a proposed Euro-
Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. 
4 Association Agreements have also been negotiated with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, The 
Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. 
5 The 1976 Trade and Cooperation Agreement granted Morocco non-reciprocal duty free access for 
industrial products whilst Morocco agreed to a Most Favoured Nation status on its EU imports.  
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Kuwait and its hard-line policy on ‘global terror’,6 Morocco was bestowed the status of 
non-NATO ally. In July 2004, Morocco became only the second Arab country after 
Jordan, and the first in North Africa, to sign a PFTA with the US. Like the MEAA, the 
Morocco-US Agreement (MUSA) is part of a broader Middle East Free Trade Area 
initiative to promote goodwill and economic stability in the region, whilst equally 
serving as a defensive countermovement by the US to restore trade competitive parity 
with the EU (Galal and Lawrence, 2003).7 This agreement has been received 
apprehensively within certain quarters of the EU, notably Morocco’s ex-colonial power 
and single largest trading partner, France,8 which may well strengthen Morocco’s 
negotiating position as the EU bids to maintain political and economic influence within 
the area.9 
 
2. Welfare impacts of EU-Moroccan Trade.  
Standard economic analysis reveals that for a small ‘price-taking’ economy 
(such as Morocco) forming a free trade area (FTA) with a partner, markets with trade 
diversion effects are potentially welfare decreasing,10 whilst trade creation effects in 
other markets are unambiguously welfare improving. However, this conclusion is 
complicated by ‘second best’ (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) market considerations, 
where the correction of certain market imperfections (i.e., tariffs) while leaving others 
untouched (i.e., price mark-ups) may not necessarily improve social welfare. This issue 
                                                 
6 Whilst Morocco did not support the recent invasion of Iraq, its own policy on terrorism has strengthened 
considerably since the suicide bombings in Casablanca in 2003. 
7 Beghazi et al. (2002) note that following the MEAA, the overall trade weighted tariff advantage 
favouring the EU (vis-à-vis the US) was estimated to be 3.3% in 2001.  
8 French Foreign Trade Minister, Francois Loos, suggested that Morocco should not expect to have 
PFTAs with the EU whilst courting the attentions of the US. The EU, however, has done something 
similar to the US by signing a PFTA with Mexico. 
9 This line of reasoning certainly applied to Mexico. After entering the NAFTA, Mexico also struck a 
bilateral accord with the EU. 
10 Generally, the larger the difference in non-distorted prices between the chosen free trade partner and 
the rest of the world, the smaller (larger) is the size of the efficiency triangle gains (tariff revenue losses) 
on formation of the FTA. 
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is pertinent to Morocco, where firms have thrived behind highly protective tariff 
barriers, which in tandem with poorly functioning competition policies, has given rise to 
dominant firms with considerable market power. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis 
abstracts from structural change, such as the potential loss of government revenue in 
Morocco from tariff elimination (Abed, 1998), the impacts of foreign competition on 
displaced labour and the investment inducing effects on capital accumulation and 
ultimately domestic growth. 
With improvements in computational power and the development of globally 
consistent trade databases, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have become 
the standard tool of analysis in the international trade policy literature (e.g., (Hertel et 
al., 1998; Hertel, T.W. et al., 2001; Mabugu, 2001; Anderson et al., 2001).11 Given their 
comprehensive coverage of regions and sectors, these models are particularly useful in 
summing trade diversion and creation effects across import markets, whilst being 
flexible enough to incorporate ‘modern’ trade theory extensions such as imperfect 
competition and capital accumulation effects.  
A specific search of the CGE related international trade literature reveals two 
EU-Morocco studies (Rutherford et al. 1997; Elbehri and Hertel, 2003). Calibrating a 
static CGE model to a 1991 database for Morocco, Rutherford et al. (1997) assess the 
impacts of eliminating tariff protection on all Moroccan-EU trade. Their estimates 
suggest that Morocco could gain approximately 1.5 percent of GDP, whilst the addition 
of a unilateral removal of Moroccan tariffs on all trade increases the gain to 2.6 per cent 
of GDP through reduced trade diversion costs. Further sensitivity experiments 
examining changes in (factor) supply elasticities produce a range of gains of between 
                                                 
11 CGE has also been employed in other fields of investigation such as environmental policy (Perroni and 
Wigle, 1997), taxation (Wehrheim, 1998), tourism (Sinclair and Stabler, 1997) and transport economics 
(Oosterhaven and Knapp, 2000). 
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1.2-2.3% of GDP for the former case, with corresponding gains of 2.3-3.4% of GDP in 
the latter case. 
In a more recent study, Elbehri and Hertel (2003) examine the issue of second 
best markets using detailed concentration ratio data for Morocco. In accordance with the 
MEAA, the authors evaluate the impact of (i) removing tariffs on manufacturing trade 
between the EU and Morocco, as well as assessing a multilateral simulation involving 
(ii) an additional 30 percent cut (comparable to what was achieved in the Uruguay 
Round) in all tariffs for Morocco, the EU and the ROW. Moreover, given the impact on 
the exchequer from the reduction in Moroccan tariffs, the authors assume that macro 
adjustment measures in Morocco through endogenous consumption tax changes are 
implemented to maintain revenue neutrality.  
The results of their long run simulations in (i) show that terms of trade losses 
from tariff reductions by Morocco lead to aggregate welfare losses of between 
US$16million (0.1%GDP) and US$400 million (1.3%GDP)12 depending on 
assumptions pertaining to free entry and exit of firms from the manufacturing 
industries.13 Morocco actually benefits under the multilateral reform scenario (between 
US$415million (1.3%GDP) and US$528million (1.7%GDP)), largely due to greatly 
reduced terms of trade. Indeed, with EU and ROW tariff reductions, the increase in 
Moroccan exports to offset Moroccan requires much smaller reductions in export prices. 
 
3. Aims 
3.1 Agricultural Trade Reforms 
                                                 
12 In order to maintain balance of payments and offset the influx of imports from Moroccan tariff 
removal, Moroccan exports must increase which means a fall in export prices. 
13 Freedom of entry and exit improves allocative efficiency through rationalisation of imperfectly 
competitive firms from inefficient/protected industries. 
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In Morocco, as in many MENA members, agriculture is the most heavily 
protected sector and provides the bulk of the income for the rural poor. Accordingly, 
free agricultural access is critical for continued economic development (De Rosa, 1996) 
and as a means of attracting further investment, thereby countering the ‘hub and spoke’ 
effects from the EU’s separate Association Agreements. For Morocco, the agricultural 
conditions of the current MEAA provide limited benefit (Alvarez-Coque and Batista, 
1994; Grethe and Tangermann, 2000) in that access is restricted to specific EU 
agricultural markets (e.g., olive oil, fruit and vegetables, wine, fish etc.) through tariff 
concessions and accompanied by quantitative limits (i.e., tariff rate quotas), seasonal 
constraints and ‘entry prices’.14 The remainder (majority) of EU produce (i.e., cereals, 
dairy and livestock) remains protected under most favoured nation status.15  
Unfortunately for Morocco (and other MENAs), deeper agricultural market 
access has been hampered for various reasons. Firstly, the degree of trade asymmetry 
between the EU and Morocco (see Table 1 below) grants the EU a stronger negotiating 
position given Morocco’s greater dependence on EU markets.16 Furthermore, with the 
slow pace of internal CAP reform, the EU is not in any haste to further assimilate 
MENA agricultural markets. For example, Morocco (along with Turkey and Israel) is a 
principal exporter of ‘typical’ Mediterranean products (i.e., fresh fruit and vegetables, 
tomatoes, citrus products and olive oil), thereby presenting a direct ‘threat’ to the 
growing areas of the Southern EU (Alvarez-Coque, 2002). Finally, EU policy makers 
are unlikely to make bilateral trade deals before the outcome of the Doha Development 
Round of talks on further multilateral trade commitments.  
                                                 
14 See Alvarez-Coque (2002) for a full discussion of these mechanisms. 
15 As stated by Alvarez-Coque (2002), the extent of trade protection in the MEAA is consistent with 
multilateral rules under article XXIV of the 1994 GATT agreement which permits ten percent of trade to 
be excluded from tariff liberalisation.  
16 Although as suggested earlier, the balance of negotiating power may have swung partially in favour of 
Morocco.  
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Due to these factors, the EU favours ‘reciprocity’ in agricultural trade 
concessions rather than unilateral goodwill. For example, the EU has agreed to increase 
Moroccan tomato quotas if Morocco opens up its markets to EU wheat. Given such high 
domestic subsidies in the EU, this could lead to disastrous consequences for Moroccan 
wheat producers and further threaten food stability in the region.17 As a result, there is 
much debate about the timing and depth of reciprocal tariff liberalisation, where 
pressure groups such as Oxfam (2004) are suggesting asymmetrical liberalisation (i.e., 
quicker EU agricultural tariff liberalisation) to allow MENA countries such as Morocco 
time to adjust to market forces whilst protecting their food security and rural 
development needs.18  
Accordingly, the first objective of this study is to examine the long-run potential 
for further welfare gains to Morocco from free agricultural and food trade. A 
Comparison of the policy scenarios in Rutherford et al. (1997) and Elbehri and Hertel 
(2003) suggests that agricultural reform would yield welfare improvements to Morocco, 
although compared with the current EU deal, it is not clear how large these gains would 
be. Moreover, in light of Morocco’s trade deal with the US, what is the long run cost to 
the EU in stalling on deepening the current Morocco Association Agreement to include 
all agricultural trade?19 
 
3.2 Non Tariff Barrier (NTB) Trade Costs 
The focus of previous multilateral trade rounds negotiations has centred largely 
on reducing formal (i.e., import tariffs, export subsidies) barriers to trade, whilst non-
                                                 
17 The agriculture sector is heterogeneous with relatively prosperous irrigated regions, whilst in contrast 
rainfed zones have a high variance of rainfall with many suffering from regular droughts. 
18 Oxfam (2004) also mentions the structural problems facing many small MENA farmers in accessing 
international markets. Thus, there is a danger that even in the advent of agricultural market liberalisation, 
the distributive gains between larger and smaller farmers could be significant. We do not examine this 
proposition in the current analysis. 
19 In both Rutherford et al. (1997) and Elbehri and Hertel (2003), no results are presented for the EU 
region to which we can compare. 
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tariff market segmenting policies (i.e., health and safety regulations, competition laws 
(particularly in services), technical standards (e.g., licensing and certification regimes, 
environmental standards), quantitative restrictions and ‘red tape’ procedures (e.g., 
customs clearance)) in partner countries continue unchallenged. A review of a number 
of trade restriction measures such as the IMF’s trade restrictiveness index (TRI), the 
World Bank’s Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) and the Heritage 
Foundation’s ‘Freedom Index’ (IMF, 2005), suggests that Morocco does appear to 
liberally employ non-tariff trade impediments to protect domestic production. 
Accordingly, an important empirical question in the context of the MEAA is the 
potential benefit from greater harmonisation or recognition of regulatory policy regimes 
between the member governments. 
Due to their inherent complexity in design, a number of CGE studies (Harrison 
et al., 1996; Baldwin et al., 1997; Vaittenen 2002; and Keuschnigg et al., 2002) 
incorporate border effects as ‘best-guess’ uniform percentage reductions in ‘iceberg-
costs’ (Samuelson, 1954)20 on affected bilateral trade routes. However, given the 
pervasiveness and variation in sectoral NTBs, a uniform percentage cost reduction is a 
rather crude measure resulting in potentially significant bias. A more refined form of 
measurement is the gravity model approach (Hoekman, 1995; Anderson and Wincoop, 
2001; Kume et al., 2001, Park, 2002), which estimates bilateral trade by commodity 
based on (inter alia) the product of the size of both countries corrected for distance and 
formal trade barriers (tariffs, subsidies). The ‘border cost’ estimates are approximated 
either from regression residuals or dummy variables estimates and tariff equivalents are 
derived.  
                                                 
20 The concept of an iceberg cost was developed by Samuelson (1954), who suggested that some fraction 
of a commodity can be conceived of as ‘melting’ away as a necessary cost of transportation over a unit of 
distance. This construct is equally applicable to other forms of trade costs such as NTBs, which inhibit the 
‘effective’ flow of goods and services from one region to another. 
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In the context of Morocco, the gravity work of Park (op. cit.) supports the trade 
restrictiveness measures cited above, where Moroccan NTB tariff equivalent barriers in 
services trade are considerable ranging between 25% for communication services and 
87% for construction.21 Equally, other studies (Lejour et al., 2001; Philippidis and 
Carrington, 2005) examining NTB costs on EU single market accession, derive NTB 
equivalents and implement them within a CGE model to evaluate NTB eliminations on 
trade flows, growth and real income changes. To our knowledge, no equivalent CGE 
studies exist under the Association Agreements. Thus, in this study, we employ a 
gravity specification to estimate and implement NTBs between Morocco and the EU 
into the CGE model specification, thereby assessing the benefits of harmonising 
regulatory policy regimes between the member governments.  
 
4. Gravity Specification 
4.1 Background and Theoretical Foundation 
To quantify non-tariff trade barriers, one may employ either a direct or indirect 
approach. Direct measurement involves collecting information (e.g., government 
documents, personal interviews with industry ‘experts’) on existing regulations and 
procedures to construct an index. Statistical or subjective approaches may be used to 
aggregate or weight the data in order to build a composite indicator. In contrast, indirect 
non-tariff barriers may be ‘conjectured’ from border price distortions or discrepancies 
between actual trade and ‘potential’ frictionless trade (Deardoff and Stern, 2004). 
In the context of this study, the use of direct measurement to capture specific 
sector (e.g., yogurts, cheese, confectionary etc.) non-tariff protection regimes would 
appear more problematic given the broad sectoral definitions (e.g., ‘dairy’) employed in 
                                                 
21 Impediments to trade of a non tariff nature (i.e., licensing, health and safety standards, technical 
standards, ‘red tape’) are largely the preserve of the services sectors. Due to their complex and varied 
nature, they are not quantified in the GTAP database. This omission is rectified in this study. 
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the CGE model. Moreover, direct measurement only captures explicit and/or recognized 
policies, and not all possible sources of restrictions to trade. For these reasons, we 
favour the use of an indirect approach. 
As noted above, one possible indirect estimation is to compare observed border 
price distortions. This technique can be employed for homogeneous goods merchandise 
trade although where there are ‘additional’ sources of (perceived) product 
differentiation, such as origin, quality or marketing elements, it becomes considerably 
more problematic to separate prices differences based purely on anti-competitive trading 
practises. Indeed, in the realm of services trade where ‘differentiation’ is the norm, 
estimating border price differences as a proxy for non-tariff barriers to trade would be 
extremely difficult to implement. 
Accordingly, in this paper we employ the gravity method of indirect estimation, 
which provides a benchmark for trade under frictionless conditions. Since the early 
works of Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has largely been used to explain trade 
flows. In its simplest form, trade between a pair of countries i and j (Xij) is a positive 
function of their economic ‘size’ and a negative function of distance. A common 
weakness of the model was its lack of theoretical rigour, although a number of authors 
(Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1989, 1990; Deardorff, 1998, Anderson and van Wincoop 
2003) have refined the empirical implementation based on a homothetic constant 
elasticity substitution (CES) Armington structure (varietal differentiation by region of 
origin) consistent with the assumption of monopolistic competition.22 
Thus, under the assumption of costless or free trade, prices across countries are 
identical. Let us consider a multi-country framework with C countries, denoted as i,j = 
1,…,C; and N varieties are available. Let iky  denote the production of variety k in 
                                                 
22 See chapter 5 of Feenstra (2003) for a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical 
development of the gravity equation.  
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country i. The GDP in each country is then23 ∑
=
=
N
1k
i
k
i y  Y while world GDP is 
∑
=
=
N
1k
iW Y  Y . Under the assumptions above, the exporter country will sell its variety in 
proportion to the importer’s GDP:  
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Summing over all products we get: 
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k
ij X Ys  
Y
YY
   Ysy s X  X ====== ∑∑
==
   [2] 
and accordingly, the total bilateral trade between countries i and j is:  
W
i
jiij
Y
YXX
jY 2  =+           [3] 
which is the simplest derivation of the gravity equation, showing that total trade 
between i and j is directly proportional to the product of their GDP’s. 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) relax the assumption of costless trade to 
include transport costs or tariffs. As a result, prices of each variety k are no longer equal 
across countries: 
i
k
ij
kk P T P
ij =          [4] 
where 
ij
kP is the cost including freight (c.i.f.) price of variety k, exported from country i 
to country j; ikP  is the free on board (f.o.b.) price of variety k, in country i; and 
ij
kT  is an 
‘iceberg cost’ (Samuelson, 1952) which states the number of units of variety k that must 
be shipped to country j in order for one unit to arrive. 
According to the specialization assumption above, each country i produces Ni 
                                                 
23 Under the assumption of free trade, prices across countries are identical; normalizing prices to unity, 
i
ky actually measures the value of production of product k in country i. 
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unique varieties (k=1,..,Ni). As a consequence, the consumption of variety k in country j 
( ijkC ) equals the exports to j coming from the only producing country i. The CES utility 
function for consumers in country j (Uj) is then (where σ is the elasticity of substitution 
across varieties): 
∑∑
=
σ−σ
=
=
C
1i
/)1(
N
1k
ij
k
j )C(  U
i
        [5] 
The sub-index k of ijkC can be dropped assuming that all varieties k imported 
from country i are sold at the same price Pij in country j, as a result of a transport cost 
equal across categories (Tij), and accordingly the utility function is simplified to:  
∑
=
σ−σ=
C
1i
/)1(ijj C  U         [6] 
A representative consumer of country j maximizes Uj subject to the budget 
constraint: 
∑
=
=
C
1i
ijijij CP N  Y         [7] 
where Yj is aggregate expenditure and income in country j. From the restricted 
maximization the demand for each product Cij is obtained: 







=
σ−
*j
j
*j
ij
ij
P
Y
P
P
  C         [8] 
where Pj* is an overall index of prices in country j: 
( ) σ−
=
σ− 

= ∑ 1
1
C
1i
1iji*j P N  P        [9] 
Combining the relation between the value of exports from country i to j: 
ijijiij C P N  X =          [10] 
with the demand function in [8] a more general gravity equation is derived: 
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To simplify the estimation of [11] the unknown number of varieties that each 
country i produces is substituted by 
 y P
Y
  N i
i
i = , where y  is fixed firm output derived 
from zero-profit conditions. Moreover, given the relationship in [4], the price in country 
j (Pij) is equal to Tij Pi. Substituting these expressions into expression [11] and 
simplifying gives: 
σ−
σ 


=
1
*j
ij
i
ji
ij
P
T
y P
 YY
  X         [12] 
In Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) this treatment is simplified further by 
imposing the market clearing condition that the value of firm output in country (or 
variety) i (f.o.b. prices Pi) equals consumer expenditure in destination country j: 
∑
=
=
C
1j
ijijii P C  yP         [13] 
and assuming that trade costs between partners i and j are symmetric: Tij = Tji. In this 
way, an implicit solution for the unknown price Pi in [13] is obtained iP~ : 
*i
-1
1
i
Wi
i
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
=         [14] 
which, when substituted in [9] leads to the overall price index: 
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=
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Substituting [14] into the gravity equation [12] a new specification for the 
gravity equation is obtained: 
σ−



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1
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Y
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Therefore, the theoretical foundation of the gravity equation expresses exports 
between two countries i and j as a function of the product of their GDP’s and their 
overall price indexes, which Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) term ‘indexes of 
multilateral resistance’ as they depend on the trade costs (see equation [15]).  
To ease estimation, the expression in [16] is linearized taking logs leading to the 
estimating gravity equation: 
*j*iijjiij P~1)ln(σP~1)ln(σσ)lnT(1lnYYln   α  lnX −+−+−+++=   [17] 
where α collects the effect of lnYW. 
In the theoretical outline above, ‘iceberg costs’ (Tij) are a quantitative frictional 
measure in delivering one unit of a product from one region to another. Empirically, this 
definition has incorporated not only transportation costs, which is usually proxied by 
distance (Distij), but also other sources of unobservable costs caused by, for example, 
currency risk, health and safety costs, red tape procedures and paperwork etc. Such non-
tariff barriers (NTB) can be approximated either employing dummy variable estimates 
or the residuals of the gravity regression.  
The dummy variable approach consists of modelling Tij, usually hypothesized as 
a log-linear relationship (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003): 
ijijij lnτDistρln   lnT +=         [18] 
where ρ is a parameter and τij is the bilateral trade barrier, which may be an 
international border (McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003); a monetary 
union (see Rose and Stanley (2005) for a full review); or a preferential trade 
agreements(see Kandogan (2003) for a full review). In Anderson and van Wincoop, 
(2003) this is modelled as: 
ijD1ij ττ −=          [19] 
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where Dij is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when regions i and j belong to the 
same country, trade agreement or currency union, and 0 otherwise; and τ-1 is the non-
tariff-barrier equivalent. Substituting [19] into [17], the gravity equation becomes: 
*j
*iijijjiij
P~ln)1(
P~ln)1()D1( ln)1(Distln)1(YlnYln     Xln
−σ+
−σ+−τσ−+ρσ−+++α=
 [20] 
Estimating equation [20] for the parameter γ (equals (1-σ)lnτ) provides an 
estimate of the ‘average’ impact of the dummy variable (1-Dij) on trade, from which it is 
possible to calculate an ‘average’ NTB tariff-equivalent estimate of the trade barrier:24 
( ) 1-
1
exp1 


σ−
γ=−τ          [21] 
Alternatively, other gravity studies (Wall, 1999; Park, 2002; Harrigan and 
Vanjani, 2003; Deardorff and Stern, 2004) a residual based method is employed which 
accounts for all of the parameters of the estimated gravity equation. This method 
compares actual and potential trade flows with respect to a free-trade benchmark, where 
it is assumed that the gravity equation provides a prediction of potential trade under 
frictionless conditions. Then, the discrepancies between actual ( ijAXln ) and predicted 
trade ( ijPXln ) are taken to be indicative of trade barriers: 
ijij
PA ln)1(XlnXln
ij τσ−=−        [22] 
Over this general definition, Francois (1999) and Park (2002) introduce two 
modifications: first, for each country j, they calculate a tariff-equivalent over all its trade 
partners. Thus, for each country j, actual ( jAM ) and predicted (
j
PM ) imports aggregating 
over all countries i≠j are calculated: 
                                                 
24 Note that if Dij were defined as 1 when regions i,j belong to different countries, trade agreements or 
currency unions, the estimated coefficient γ would be (σ-1)ln τ, and the tariff-
equivalent: ( ) 1-
1
exp1 


−σ
γ=−τ  
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where ijpX  are the anti-logs of the predicted estimates of the gravity equation. 
Moreover, these studies normalize the difference between actual and predicted trade 
relative to a free-trade benchmark (τb), where the greatest positive difference between 
actual and predicted trade is chosen as benchmark: 


=τ j
P
j
Ab
M
MMax . Combining these 
modifications with equation [22] leads to: 
( ) jbj
P
j
A lnln
M
Mln τσ−=τ−



       [24] 
and solving for the tariff-equivalent (τj) of the NTB imposed by country j is: 
( ) ( )( ) 1M/M1lnM/Mlnexp)1( /1b jPjA/1bjPjAj −



τ=−τ−=−τ
σ−
σ−   [25] 
In the final model specification, we favour the residual based approach for two 
reasons. Firstly, unlike the dummy-based method, the residual-based method is more 
general, as it provides an estimate of all potential NTB barriers on trade rather than 
NTBs solely related to the dummy in question. Moreover, the residual approach is 
flexible it that it allows the estimation of bi-directional NTB barriers between specific 
trade partners (i,j), rather than the ‘average’ NTB cost estimates provided in the dummy 
specification. 
  
4.2 The empirical gravity equation and data and results 
The theoretical based gravity equation has been extended in the empirical 
literature to improve the treatment of transportation costs. For example, Bergstrand, 
(1985) and Thoumi (1989) include ‘shared borders’ and ‘landlocked’ dummies in their 
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models, whilst recent studies (Garman et al., 1998; Limao and Venables, 1999, 
Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman, 2003) incorporate the importance of 
infrastructure in facilitating trade between partners. Other authors include cultural or 
historical linkages that may favour international trade, such as a common language 
and/or ex-colonial ties (e.g. Frankel et al., 1995; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Park, 
2002), whilst Arnon et al., (1996) and Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman, (2003) 
examine the Linder effect, that is, the hypothesis that countries with similar per capita 
incomes trade more prolifically. 
In light of these developments in the literature, the empirical gravity 
specification estimated in this study is: 
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 [26] 
where: 
xij : logarithm of exports from country i to country j 
gdpi : logarithm of GDP in country i 
gdpj : logarithm of GDP in country j 
sqincij : logarithm of square difference of per capita GDPs in countries i and j 
Pri : level of prices indicator in country i with respect to US 
Prj : level of prices indicator in country j with respect to US 
Infri : infrastructure indicator in country i 
Infrj : infrastructure indicator in country j 
distij : logarithm of distance between country i and j 
Contij : dummy variable that takes value 1 when countries i and j share a 
common border and 0 otherwise 
Langij : dummy variable that takes value 1 when countries i and j share a 
common language, and 0 otherwise 
Mtj : import tariff rate (%) imposed by the importer country j (negative 
values imply that country j subsidizes imports) 
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Xsi : export subsidy rate (%) imposed by the exporter country i (negative 
values imply that country i impose a tariff on exports) 
 
To estimate the model, US dollar value data on bilateral exports comes from 
version 6 of the GTAP database, benchmarked to 2001. The countries included in the 
analysis are: the (pre-enlargement) members of the EU, the recent 10 EU accession 
members, Bulgaria and Romania; the US, Canada, Alaska, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Columbia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela and Morocco. The rest of countries are 
aggregated as: Central America, rest of Andean Pact, Rest of Caribbean, Rest of South 
America, Rest of FTAA, Middle East, Rest of North Africa, and Rest of the World. 
Therefore, in total there are 9 composites and 38 individual countries, making a total of 
2170 observations. To reduce the proportion of unexplained trade attributable to non-
tariff barriers, we following Baier and Bergstrand (2001) by including GTAP bilateral 
import tariff data, which we have supplemented with export subsidy data from the same 
source. 
To generate consistency with the bilateral trade data, we employ GDP values at 
current prices (2001) for each country in the sample from the GTAP database. 
Employing current price GDP data is also considered to better proxy export supply and 
import demand potential (Gros and Gociarz, 1996). GDP coefficients are expected to be 
positive and close to unity, as suggested by the theory (Anderson and Wincoop, 2003). 
For example, on the supply side higher regional income indicates greater economic 
activity and therefore greater availability of goods for exportation; while on the demand 
side, a higher income is positively related with the propensity to import. Given the 
Linder hypothesis, it is anticipated that the larger the differences in per capita income, 
the less likely is trade between the partner countries. 
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In equation [17] the price indexes are not observable. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) first estimate a specific trade cost function (Tij) in terms of distance 
and unknown trade barriers and use these estimates to derive implicit price indexes in 
[15] which are used in the estimation of the gravity equation [17] using non-linear least 
squares. Alternatively, other authors have employed standard estimation techniques 
(e.g., OLS) to proxy prices indexes using GDP’s deflators (eg. Bergstrand 1985, 1989; 
Baier and Bergstrand, 2001) or wholesale price indexes (eg. Park, 2002).25 Finally, it is 
possible to replace the price indexes by country specific fixed effects, particularly when 
panel data are employed (eg. Matyas, 1997; Jakab et al., 2001; Kurihara, 2003; Egger 
and Pfaffermayr, 2003).26  
To avoid some of the drawbacks recognized by the literature on using aggregate 
price indexes, such as the different base period of indexes across countries and 
movements in exchange rates which make difficult to compare price levels across 
countries, we have built a relative price indicator. Employing IMF (2005) data, we 
collect US dollar equivalent purchasing power parities (PPP) for 2001 in each country. 
Subsequently, exchange rates or foreign currency units per dollar are collected for the 
same period (http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory). The ratio of the PPP to th 
exchange rate provides an index of the level of prices in each country with respect to the 
US.  
The infrastructure indicators are calculated in a similar way to Limao and 
Venables (1999) and Martinez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehman (2003) as the per capita 
                                                 
25 However, Feenstra (2003) notes that a drawback of using published aggregate price indexes is the 
difficulty of comparing price levels across countries where index base periods differ. Moreover, Anderson 
and Wincoop (2003,p.16) note that employing price indices that necessarily include non-tradable items 
and nominal exchange rates do not accurately represent real tradable price differences between partner 
countries. 
26 When cross-section data are used, the degrees of freedom reduce drastically, and only one specific 
effect (dummy variable) for each country can be included, either when the country is an importer or an 
exporter, but not for specific pairs of trade partners as this would lead to a number of dummy variables 
equal to the number of observations.  
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ratio of the total network of highways and railways for each country in the sample. 
Population, highway and railway data was taken from the World Bank’s economic 
indicators and the CIA Factbook. It is expected that an efficient infrastructure network 
(lower transport costs) will impact favourably on trade (Bougheas et al., 1999). 
 The distance data for each of the countries in the sample are great circle 
distances between capital cities. For the composite regions, an arbitrary capital was 
selected (see appendix 1.1). As a direct proxy for transport cost, the expected parameter 
sign in the regression is negative. Contiguity and common languages dummies were 
assigned for each of the sample countries and consistent with other literature, are 
expected to positively affect trade. Finally, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is applied in 
the estimation, and White’s consistent covariance matrix estimator is used to avoid the 
possible bias of OLS standard errors due to heteroskedasticity. 
Results of the gravity equation estimation are shown in Table 2. The Adjusted 
R2 range between 0.599 in other agricultural products sector and 0.933 in services, with 
a majority of sectors with an Adjusted R2 higher than 0.74.  Therefore, the gravity 
equation more than adequately explains bilateral trade across a wide range of individual 
industries. A Condition Number under 100 indicates that multicollinearity amongst 
explanatory variables is not a serious problem. 
Incomes of exporter and importer countries are all positive, significant at 1%, 
and with parameter estimates close to unity, as predicted by economic theory. A Linder 
effect is found to be significant in 8 out of 22 sectors: the square difference per capita 
income is negative and significant at 5% in food sectors, raw materials and utilities. 
However, this variable is positive and significant in textiles and light manufacturing 
sectors, implying that in these industries, trade increases when there are greater 
differences in factor endowments, proxied by per capita incomes.  
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The effect of the relative price indicators is mixed across sectors and depends on 
whether it is the exporter’s or importer’s price: the exporter’s price is significant in all 
but three of the sectors and a negative effect predominates (13 sectors); the importer’s 
price, on the other hand, is significant in 14 sectors, while positive effects predominate 
(10 sectors). Infrastructure indicators are positive and significant as expected in most of 
the sectors (18 sectors). Distance has a highly significant and negative impact on trade 
in all sectors, with coefficients close to unity, while contiguity of the countries favour 
trade significantly, in particular, in the agrofood related sectors. Interestingly, in the 
services sector, the negative impact of distance is minimum while contiguity has a 
negative effect which is in agreement with Lejour et al. (2001) results. Apart from trade 
in utilities and services sectors, countries which share a common language trade more. 
Finally, bilateral routes which impose non-zero import tariffs and export 
subsidies significantly affect trade. Surprisingly, the tariff coefficient is positive 
suggesting that greater tariff barriers are consistent with higher bilateral trade flows. 
Given the cross sectional nature of the data, we speculate that this is a spurious 
relationship, where many regions which trade heavily (particularly the EU) also levy 
significant tariffs. The subsidy results are also slightly ambiguous. Whilst the majority 
of the sectors have positive coefficient estimates for subsidies, a number are also 
negative. Once again, we suggest that this is a spurious outcome as in the case of the 
tariff estimates. 
 
4.3 Calculation and Implementation of NTBs 
The tariff equivalents of NTBs are calculated from the residuals or the 
differences between actual and predicted trade employing equation [25]. However, we 
extend the model to calculate bi-directional NTBs on imports by sector between specific 
  
 
21
pairs of partner countries. Thus, in the context of this paper, we calculate bi-directional 
sectoral NTBs between Morocco and the EU regions (EU15 and EU12). Moreover, to 
simulate the enlargement of the single market in the baseline, we estimate NTB costs 
between the EU15 and the EU12. The benchmark is calculated as above, although 
instead of calculating the ratio of actual and predicted total imports of a country j over 
all its trading partners as in equation [23], we repeat the procedure but only on trade 
between those countries of interest. Thus, to calculate the NTB equivalents when the 
EU15 imports from EU12: 
∑∑
= =
=
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= =
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   [27] 
Reference to equation [25] shows that the derivation of tariff equivalents 
requires sectoral elasticity of substitution estimates, which are taken from the GTAP 
database (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2005). The extrapolated tariff equivalent values 
of the NTB for each sector from the underlying sectoral regressions are provided in 
Table 3. Examining the results from the regression suggest that NTB tariff equivalents 
in agriculture and food sectors are relatively high compared with non-food sectors. This 
result concurs with other gravity based tariff equivalent studies of Columbian-NAFTA 
trade (Bussolo and Roland-Holst, 1998), european enlargement (Lejour et al., 2001) and 
borrowed NTB tariff equivalent estimates in Monteagudo and Watanuki (2003), whilst 
similar tariff equivalent peaks in beverages and tobacco are also found in Chemingui 
and Dessus (2004) study of NTB protection in Syria. 
In the standard GTAP treatment, NTB trade costs are not incorporated explicitly 
within the database. To simulate their removal without altering the benchmark data, we 
follow the approach employed in Hertel et al., (2001) who distinguish between 
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‘observed’ and ‘effective’ prices and quantities of trade.27 Thus, the ‘effective’ import 
price (PMSE) of good i from exporting region r to importing region s is a function of the 
observed import price (PMSO) divided by an exogenous technical coefficient (AMS), 
which captures changes in bilateral trade efficiency such as removal of NTBs: 
 sri
O
sri
E
sri AMSPMSPMS ,,,,,, /=        [28] 
An increase in AMS captures reductions in trade costs by reducing the effective price of 
good i in importing region s from a given exporter r. Since efficiency enhancement (i.e., 
NTB removal) reduces trade costs, in true ‘iceberg cost’ fashion, it also increases the 
effective quantity of export goods from region r. Thus, in the GTAP model, the 
effective quantity of exports is the product of observed exports and the technical 
coefficient: 
 sri
O
sri
E
sri AMSQXSQXS ,,,,,, ×=        [29] 
Note, that since the effective and observed values are identical in the benchmark data, 
there are no changes in producer revenues and therefore recalibration of the benchmark 
database is not necessary.  
 
5. CGE Data Aggregation and CGE Modelling Baseline Assumptions 
To examine the long run potential resource and welfare impacts of the removal 
of agricultural tariff barriers and non-tariff trading costs, we employ the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) model and accompanying version 6 database (Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2005).28 In the standard GTAP framework, conventional neo-classical 
behaviour (utility maximisation, cost minimisation) is assumed, whilst regional utility is 
aggregated over private demands (non-homothetic), public demands and savings 
                                                 
27 A full description of the exact implementation of bilateral import augmenting technical change is 
provided in Hertel et al. (2001). 
28 The model description here is brief. For a fully detailed discussion of the model see Hertel (1997).  
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(investment demand). Production is characterised employing a perfectly competitive, 
constant-returns-to-scale technology, and bilateral trade flows are modelled using the 
Armington (1969) specification to allow for imperfect substitution between 
heterogeneous products. To apportion investment expenditures across regions, a 
fictitious agent, known as the global bank, collects global investment funds (regional 
savings) and disburses them across regions such that changes in expected rates of return 
are equalised. Given the long run closure, we assume full employment in all factor 
markets (wages are fully flexible) and free entry and exit of firms in imperfectly 
competitive sectors. 
The GTAP database, currently in its sixth incarnation, represents a significant 
advance on version 5 in terms of (inter alia) broader regional coverage (87 regions), 
improved trade and demand elasticity estimates and significant refinements to the 
support and protection data. Our 22 sector disaggregation covers Morocco’s main 
production and trade (both import and export) activities.29 The 15 manufacturing sectors 
(including six food processing) are characterised as Cournot oligopolistic,30 whilst 
services and agricultural sectors are assumed perfectly competitive.31 Concentration 
ratio data are employed to calibrate manufacturing sector firm numbers in all regions.32 
The choice of regional aggregation reflects Morocco’s key trading partner, the European 
Union (EU15 and EU12 regions – see also below), its recent agreement with the USA33 
and a residual region (Rest of the World – ROW). 
                                                 
29 The sectors are: Crops, vegetables and fruit, livestock, other agriculture, raw materials, meat products, 
vegetable oils and fats, dairy, sugar processing, other food processing, beverages and tobacco, textiles, 
wearing apparel, wood, paper and publishing, chemical products, metal products, motor vehicles, light 
manufacturing, other manufacturing, utilities, other services. 
30 Given long run closure, we assume free entry/exit of firms from imperfectly competitive sectors. 
31 We refrain from using this assumption in services sectors since data on services concentration ratios for 
the chosen sectors was not forthcoming. Moreover, the potential bias of introducing arbitrary firm 
numbers in these sectors could be considerably larger (particularly in removing trade costs) than 
assuming a perfectly competitive paradigm.  
32 See appendix 1.2 for a discussion of the oligopolistic sector modelling assumptions. 
33 After the EU27, Morocco’s largest single country trade partner is the USA. 
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To conduct an assessment of the long run impacts of Moroccan-EU trade reform, 
baseline shocks are employed in each of the five regions on productivity, growth, 
skilled and unskilled labour endowments and population (Jensen and Frandsen, 2003, 
World Bank, 2005) to project the world economy to 2015.34 The baseline scenario also 
includes trade policy shocks to export subsidies and import tariffs to capture both the 
Uruguay Round (UR) and a stylised Millennium Round (MR) outcome,35 and the 
elimination of all tariffs under the Moroccan-US and Moroccan-EU bilateral 
agreements. In the MUSA, all tariff are eliminated on bilateral trade. To characterise the 
MEAA, all non-food manufacturing tariffs are eliminated whilst for food manufacturing 
industries, we follow the approach of Elbehri and Hertel (2003) where only that portion 
of the EU (Moroccan) tariff that protects EU (Moroccan) non-agricultural inputs is 
eliminated. Given that the non-agricultural input content in EU food processing sectors 
is considerably higher than in Morocco, as a proportion of the total import tariff, the EU 
undergoes greater cuts in the baseline compared with Morocco. 
Importantly, over the eleven year time horizon of the baseline the EU is set to 
enlarge to 27 members given the scheduled inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. 
Accordingly, all tariff and subsidy barriers are removed between the EU15 and EU12 
regions. In addition, derived trade costs estimates from our gravity specification are 
eliminated following the iceberg costs approach (see section 4.3) to characterise the 
                                                 
34 The Millennium Round (MR) talks are scheduled to conclude in 2005, to be implemented from 2006 at 
the earliest. Assuming a similar implementation time period as the Uruguay Round (10 years) for 
developing countries, this would imply completion of the MR reforms in 2015. Moreover, 95% of trade 
between Morocco and the USA will be tariff free by 2013. The pace of some of the agricultural reform 
under MUSA is a little slower due to staged reductions in tariff rate quotas, although here it is assumed 
that all protection is eliminated by 2015. The EU-Moroccan Association Agreement in industrial products 
will conclude in 2012. 
35 Given the benchmark year of 2001, the developed country protection has been fully implemented under 
the UR. For developing countries (Morocco and trade weighted part of the ROW), we assume a linear 
time path proportion of protection has been removed, where for import tariffs dirty tariff shocks are 
employed using data from Harrison et al. (1995). In addition, further tariff reductions under the MR are 
assumed to be 30% for all partners following Elbehri and Hertel, (2003). Finally, we assume that export 
subsidy expenditure is eliminated on all routes under the MR. 
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formation of the single market. Given the focus on Morocco, CAP support mechanisms 
are not explicitly modelled (i.e., quotas, CAP budget). On the other hand, we have 
endeavoured to represent the evolution of CAP support to reflect WTO and internal 
reform considerations. Thus, all output subsidies in the EU are removed to reflect the 
removal of Amber Box support, whilst the representation of the single farm payment 
follows Jensen and Frandsen (2004), in that we remove all input subsidy wedges and 
reinsert them as uniform hectare premiums in all land using sectors in the EU15. In the 
case of the EU12, we impose the same uniform headage premiums payments as 
calculated for the EU15.36 
Finally, since there are significant tariffs on, inter alia, agro-food production 
(especially in Morocco), we assume that both Moroccan and EU governments pursue a 
compensatory tax policy (i.e., tax neutrality) to offset the tariff (and therefore welfare) 
losses to the exchequer from full elimination of import trade barriers. 
 
6. CGE Simulation Design and Results 
6.1 Scenario Design 
Against the ‘background’ shocks of the baseline scenario, we examine three 
alternative scenarios examining successively deeper reforms on Moroccan-EU bilateral 
trade. In scenario 1, we examine the impacts of full removal of primary agricultural 
bilateral tariffs and the remaining portion of the EU (Moroccan) tariff that protects EU 
(Moroccan) agricultural inputs in food processing sectors.37 Scenario 2 builds on 
scenario 1 in that we remove all NTB trade costs on agro-food trade between the two 
                                                 
36 Given accession of an additional 12 members to the EU15, the increase/decrease to the EU27 common 
external tariffs (CETs) to reproduce the original EU15 CETs are calculated before the 30% Millennium 
round cut. 
37 Given that the agricultural input content in Moroccan food processing sectors is considerably higher 
than in the EU, as a proportion of the remaining import tariff, Morocco’s tariff cuts are considerably 
greater than in the EU. 
  
 
26
partners. Finally, Scenario 3 examines complete abolition of tariff and NTB trade costs. 
The focus of the results is on Morocco, whilst regional impacts are reported for both 
Morocco and the EU27. 
 
6.2 Results 
6.2.1 EU-Moroccan Trade relations 
With a 76% and 56% share of primary agricultural and food processing sectors 
respectively, the EU dominates Moroccan agro-food export trade. In particular, 
‘vegetables, fruits and nuts’, ‘other agriculture’ (mainly fishing) and ‘meat processing’ 
exports to the EU account for 78%, 94% and 75% of Morocco’s totals respectively. As 
a source of imports, the EU plays less of a role, accounting for only 36% and 39% of 
agricultural and food sector imports respectively, although Morocco relies heavily on 
imports of EU livestock and dairy imports. Finally, aggregating across all trading 
sectors shows that the EU accounts for approximately 60% of Morocco’s trading 
activity. 
Table 1 shows agro-food trade and protection data for Morocco and the EU27 in 
2001. In the first three columns of data we present Moroccan exports, imports and 
sectoral trade balances with the EU27 respectively. A cursory glance at the data reveals 
that Morocco has trade surpluses in primary agricultural ($US0.236bn) and food 
($US0.331bn) trade. A closer examination of the individual sectors reveals a large trade 
deficit in the crops sector (which includes cereals, oilseeds and sugar), whilst Moroccan 
exports of vegetables, fruits and nuts oilseeds are in healthy surplus. In the food 
processing sector, the largest surplus appears in the ‘other food’ processing sector which 
includes traditional Moroccan exports of canned vegetables, fruits and fish (Elbehri and 
Hertel, 2003). The final two columns show the structure of protection in both regions, 
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where in comparison to the EU, Moroccan import protection is significantly higher 
across agro-food product categories, with Moroccan meat products, dairy production 
and ‘typical produce’ (i.e., vegetables and fruit) most heavily protected. In the EU, 
primary agricultural import barriers are very low or even zero with the exception of 
‘vegetables and fruit’. In processed food sectors, EU protection is more evident, 
especially in ‘meat products’ and ‘vegetable oils and fats’ sectors.  
 
6.2.2 Scenario 1 vs. Baseline 
 Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 show Morocco’s aggregate sectoral trade balances 
in the 2001 benchmark and changes in Moroccan sectoral trade balances from abolition 
of all agro-food import protection between the EU27 and Morocco. Examining the 
Moroccan primary agricultural trade balances, only ‘vegetables and fruit’ show real 
improvement ($US0.052bn.) as (i) it is the only EU primary agricultural sector with 
significant protection on Moroccan imports and (ii) Morocco has considerable export 
trade with the EU27 in this sector ($US0.400bn, see Table 1). In ‘crops’ and ‘livestock’ 
sectors, trade balances worsen as Moroccan import demand responds to the removal of 
high agricultural Moroccan tariffs on EU imports. Worryingly, from the perspective of 
Morocco, the deterioration in the ‘crops’ trade balance is estimated to fall below -
$US1bn as a result of full tariff elimination, whilst also accounting for 118% of the 
deteriorating change in the primary agricultural trade balance. In ‘other agriculture’ 
which primarily includes fishing activities, EU import protection is zero and Moroccan 
imports are small ($US0.003bn). Thus, a unilateral removal of Morocco’s import tariff 
only leads to insignificant negative changes to the trade balance. 
Changes in output in primary agricultural sectors reflect conditions in domestic 
and foreign markets. With the exception of the ‘vegetables, fruit and nuts’ sector, 
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primary agricultural bilateral tariff removal is close to a unilateral tariff removal by 
Morocco. Accordingly, in ‘vegetables, fruit and nuts’ export led growth stimulates 
domestic output increases of 3.6% above the baseline. By contrast, in ‘crops’ and ‘other 
agriculture’ sectors, import substitution reduces domestic demands and sectoral outputs. 
This result (particularly in the crops sector) certainly supports the assertion by Oxfam 
that core subsistence sectors could suffer from a bilateral tariff elimination deal.38  
In the ‘livestock’ sector, output increases despite the deterioration in the trade 
balance since intermediate input (domestic) demands from the expanding downstream 
‘meat products’ sector rise. Indeed, in the food processing sectors, domestic output 
changes are complicated by the response of imperfectly competitive rationalisation 
effects to tariff removal. As noted above, many Moroccan (food) manufacturing 
industries are highly concentrated after many years of tariff protection. Accordingly, 
tariff elimination is likely to yield significant rationalisation effects. Morocco’s meat 
processing sector is unusually characterised by the fact that export demand is 
considerably larger than domestic demand. Thus, with EU elimination of tariffs 
increased export demand has larger than normal impacts on Moroccan sector output,39 
which leads to increases in output per firm (see Table 4). The extent of the fall in the 
domestic mark-up from the large increase in firm numbers,40 increases the export 
competitiveness of the sector thereby improving the trade balance by $US0.456bn. 
In ‘dairy’ and particularly ‘other food’ processing sectors Moroccan import 
tariffs are relatively high compared with the EU. Thus, on bilateral tariff elimination 
Moroccan trade balances deteriorate -$US0.068bn and -$US0.019bn in ‘dairy’ and 
                                                 
38 See also appendix 2. 
39 Note that the large percentage increase in meat product output of 159% in Table 4 is calculated from a 
small base flow. The meat products sector in Morocco is the smallest of the food processing sectors in the 
aggregation. 
40 We assume free entry and exit of firms in the long run. See appendix 1.2 for further details of the 
characterisation of imperfectly competitive sectors. 
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‘other food’ sectors respectively. With increased import substitution, domestic sales 
also fall resulting in contracting output and increased mark-ups relative to the baseline. 
In ‘vegetable oils and fats’, the structure of bilateral protection between the EU and 
Morocco greatly favours the latter, where EU export demand on bilateral abolition 
results in strong (11%) sectoral and per firm output growth. Finally, in ‘sugar 
processing’ and ‘beverages and tobacco’, there is relatively greater tariff parity between 
both the EU and Morocco. However, bilateral tariff removal appears to marginally 
benefit these sectors’ trade balances and outputs compared with the trade diversion 
losses facing Morocco in the baseline from formation of the European single market. 
 
Regional Gains41 
Despite large inter-sectoral effects in Moroccan agro-food sectors from complete 
liberalisation of agro-food trade with the EU27, welfare estimates in Table 5 column 2, 
suggest that Morocco gains only marginally from agro-food liberalisation by 
$US0.067bn, or a per capita income real income gain of 0.14 per cent above the 
baseline.42 Allocative efficiency is measured as the money metric change in the usage of 
a taxed/subsidised (higher valued/lower valued) resource or product from elimination of 
a given market distortion (e.g., import tariff).43 In the context of this simulation, whilst 
tariffs are falling they still lead to simultaneous increases in imports (ceteris paribus) 
resulting in cumulative increases in allocative efficiency. Accordingly, a positive 
allocative efficiency estimate is a measure of pareto improvement in resource 
                                                 
41 For a full discussion of EV welfare decomposition, see McDougall (2003). 
42 The aggregate percentage real income gains are presented as per capita given the non-homotheticity of 
the private utility function in the GTAP model structure. 
43 Thus, a tariff on a product implies an ‘under-efficient’ usage of resources as the economy is 
producing/consuming less compared with free undistorted market forces. Conversely, a subsidy 
encourages over-production (i.e., more than under free market conditions) and therefore is a waste of 
resources. 
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allocation.44 Thus, EU-Moroccan agro-food tariff elimination results in an allocative 
efficiency gain of $US0.045bn for Morocco. 
With the interaction of countrys/regions in the CGE model (all domestic markets 
clear), the global balance of payments must net to zero (i.e., one region’s balance of 
trade surplus must be compensated by another region’s balance of trade deficit). This 
‘closure’ condition implies that total savings and imports must equal total investment 
and exports.45 Under long run closure, investment is directly determined by fixed 
savings rates respecting the long run empirical observation that domestic saving 
finances domestic investment (Francois et al., 1996). Thus, import increases from 
unilateral tariff liberalisation require export increases to restore trade balance which 
implies significant reductions in export prices, which, Ceteris paribus, would lead to a 
terms of trade (ToT) loss. However, however, given reciprocal elimination of EU 
import tariffs on protected agro-food sectors, the required reduction in Moroccan export 
prices to stimulate export demands is muted, resulting in a marginal ToT gain of 
$US0.008bn to Morocco.  
Employing standard economic partial equilibrium analysis, opening up 
imperfectly competitive sectors to trade competition through a unilateral abolition of 
tariff barriers leads, ceteris paribus, to a rationalisation of firms in the industry whilst 
output of incumbent firms increases.46 With industry fixed costs now spread over 
greater production units at the firm level, average cost and output price under zero long 
run profit assumptions will fall. In Table 5, the pro-competitive estimates presented are 
                                                 
44 Note that the implementation of a private consumption tax replacement scheme to offset lost tariff 
revenues has a dampening effect on allocative efficiency in that compensatory increases in private 
consumption taxes reduce private demands. 
45 In a CGE model, the closure or split of exogenous/endogenous variables, determines the 
macroeconomic assumptions underlying the model. In this closure, this is merely a formalisation of the 
fact that the current and capital accounts must balance (i.e., balance of payments is zero). 
46 This analysis is complicated in a general equilibrium specification, since it is possible that industry 
output may also decline as primary resources are diverted to sectors which are more trade competitive. 
Thus, as well as rationalisation in the number of firms, it is possible in some sectors that incumbent firms 
may also reduce the scale of their output. 
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aggregate efficiency gains across all industry firms from scale increases. In Morocco, 
pro-competitive effects are slightly positive ($US0.004bn), where improvements in 
oligopolistic food sectors (except ‘dairy’ and ‘other food’) from increased per-firm 
output of $US0.011,47 offset aggregate non-food sector output per firm contractions (-
$US0.007) as resources are diverted toward the food sectors relative to the baseline. 
The projections costs measure the money metric or real income value 
contributions of exogenous projections in population, factor endowments and 
productivity.48 In Morocco, the contribution of all three projections increases as the 
values of primary factors, production and real income rise relative to the baseline in 
response to agro-food tariff elimination.  
Examining the welfare impacts in the EU27 in Table 5 reveals that an agro-food 
tariff free deal with Morocco would also benefit the EU27. In other words, the real long 
run cost of allowing the Morocco-US bilateral deal to go unchallenged is estimated to 
be $0.234billion, although as Table 5 shows, as a proportion of EU27 real income, the 
gain is negligible (+0.0 per cent of GDP).49 The main areas of gain are the allocative 
efficiency effects ($US0.184bn) from elimination of EU27 tariffs (particularly ‘meat 
products’ tariffs) and terms of trade gains ($US0.052bn). In the EU27, projections 
increases in EV are dominated by rising productivity and endowments contributions as 
production and primary factor values increase relative to the baseline. 
As noted in section 4.3, the treatment of trade costs follows Samuelson’s (1954) 
‘iceberg costs’ approach. In theoretical terms, the trade costs are equivalent variation 
value estimates of an upward shift in the marginal value product of an input. In GTAP, 
                                                 
47 Overall, Moroccan food processing output expands 7.4% compared with the baseline (see Table 4). 
Most of the food processing gain comes from representative output per firm increases in the highly 
concentrated (i.e., significant fixed costs) sugar processing sector. 
48 Note in the case of population, real income changes are measured as per capita values multiplied by 
population to gain a national equivalent variation estimate. 
49 Moreover, concerns that EU vegetables and fruit sectors could be seriously affected by comparative 
advantage in Morocco are not supported in these results (estimated output reduction (not shown) of only 
0.2 per cent), whilst crops output in the EU rises 0.8 per cent from free market access to Morocco. 
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the definition of such ‘inputs’ may be broadened to include primary factors, 
intermediate inputs, or even inputs (purchases) to final demands. Thus, a positive trade 
cost efficiency estimate is attributed to greater trade possibilities from improved import 
‘efficiency’. Note, that unlike tariff cuts, there is no loss in revenue to the importing 
country from the ‘removal’ of trade costs. Indeed, the welfare impacts are 
unambiguously positive as trade cost removal lowers the effective price of products on 
all affected bilateral routes in the importing country.  
In scenario 1, Table 5 shows non-zero trade costs in the EU27 given the 
elimination of additional non-tariff trade barriers on formation of the single market (i.e., 
EU15 becomes EU27). The negative trade cost estimate relative to the baseline 
represents reduced trade cost efficiency from formation of the European single market 
due to trade diversion to Morocco from bilateral elimination of agro-food tariff 
eliminations. 
 
6.3 Scenarios 2 and 3 
 Table 3 also presents regional welfare impacts from removal of agro-food NTB 
trade costs (scenario 2) and all NTB trade costs (scenario 3) between Morocco and the 
EU27. That Morocco’s EV gains rise considerably under scenarios 2 and 3 reflects the 
importance of the EU27 as a trading partner. In scenario 2, the opportunity cost 
estimates of non-tariff barriers to trade (i.e., trade costs) in Morocco are estimated to be 
$US0.458bn relative to the baseline, whilst in scenario 3 these gains are magnified 
approximately six-fold to $US2.713bn. Accordingly, in aggregate EV terms Morocco’s 
long run per capita real income gains are estimated to be 3.3% above the baseline 
($US1.501bn) in scenario 2, whilst complete removal of all trade barriers could yield a 
long run per capita real income gain to Morocco of 12.23% ($US5.945bn).  
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As a result of enhanced import trade between Morocco and the EU27 from 
abolition of trade costs, allocative efficiency rises in both regions. In Morocco, under 
conditions of scenario 2 and 3, allocative efficiency increases $US0.283bn and 
$US0.950bn respectively. Moreover, the increased level of trade induced economic 
activity in scenario 2 bids up Moroccan factor prices (not shown) resulting in greater 
terms of trade gains ($US0.706bn). A similar, albeit magnified, result occurs in scenario 
3 leading to even greater terms of trade gains ($US0.757bn).  
 In the imperfectly competitive sectors, the removal of food processing trade cost 
barriers results in reductions in aggregate pro-competitive effects of -$US0.043bn. Food 
sector gains ($US0.163bn) are outweighed by reductions in non-food sectors (-
$US0.206bn) as resources are diverted toward food sector activities. Removal of all 
trade costs benefits both food and non-food sectors. Indeed, given high benchmark 
concentration and mark-ups in ‘chemical products’, ‘motor vehicles’ and ‘other 
manufacturing’ sectors, increased scale effects lead to significant pro-competitive 
effects from these sectors. Finally, projections costs in Morocco are dominated by 
population projections. Thus, increased exogenous population contributions to 
aggregate EV reflect successively increasing per capita real income gains.  
Finally, as in Morocco, the largest EU27 welfare gains are from allocative 
efficiency and NTB trade costs reductions, resulting in aggregate EV gains of 
$US2.898bn and $US3.548bn respectively, or per capita real income gains of 0.03% 
and 0.04% in scenarios 2 and 3 respectively.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In recent years, the vacuum left by the failure of the ongoing multilateral trade 
talks to reach agreement has been filled by a more bilateralist or regionalist stance to 
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free trade. The US has aggressively pursued such a stance in recent years, signing 
numerous bilateral treaties whilst also pushing to create regionalist free trading areas 
such as a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and a Middle East Free Trade Area 
(MEFTA) initiative. As a counterbalance to US dominance in global trading relations, 
the EU have followed suit and are currently negotiating bilateral trade and/or 
association agreements with (inter alia) the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi-Arabia), Mercosur (Argentine, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), 
and the Mediterranean littoral countries and Syria. In addition, the EU plans to conclude 
regional trade liberalisation agreements, the so-called Economic Partnership 
Agreements, with the ACP-countries.   
Whilst the benefits to poorer trading nations outside of the multilateral 
framework are marginal at best, Morocco has successfully negotiated trade agreements 
with both players.50 Indeed, the depth of the US-Moroccan trade agreement is typical of 
the new US threat to EU political and economic influence within the Middle East and 
North Africa. In the context of Morocco, the association agreement with the EU falls 
significantly short of the US trade deal within the sphere of agro-food trade. Thus, in 
this paper we examine the potential additional impacts of extending the existing 
Morocco-EU association agreement (examined in Elbehri and Hertel, 2003) to include 
the agro-food trade liberalisation. A further aim of the paper is to deepen the reform 
scenario to measure the welfare impacts of NTB removal between the EU and Morocco. 
Indeed, removal of non-tariff trade costs have been largely untouched within the 
multilateral forum, whilst to our knowledge this is the first study of this type applied to 
Morocco. 
                                                 
50 Israel and Jordan also have bilateral FTAs with the US. 
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To measure NTBs, we estimate potential trade employing a residual based 
theoretically consistent gravity model, which allows for a comprehensive range of 
cultural, geographical, per capita income and infrastructure dummy variables consistent 
with recent gravity studies in the literature. The model results shows that the 
explanatory power of the model (adjusted R2) is greater than 0.74 for a majority of 
sectors, while most of the explanatory variables are highly significant and affect trade 
consistently with the theory. Comparing potential trade estimates from the gravity 
model with actual trade flows, we derive NTB tariff equivalents across each of the 
sectors which are subsequently implemented within the CGE model to calculate trade 
and welfare impacts. 
The results of the agro-food liberalisation scenario suggest that Morocco’s 
potential trade and growth gains are limited. We suggest that the trade diversionary 
impacts on Moroccan agro-food markets from expansion of the EU to twenty-seven 
members and the inclusion of multilateral tariff reductions under a stylised Millenium 
Round outcome in our baseline, greatly reduces Morocco’s ‘additional’ gains. 
Furthermore, whilst Morocco’s specialisation in ‘typical’ Mediterranean vegetables, 
fruits and nuts products reaps gains, the crop sector which sustains many of the rural 
poor contracts. The latter result supports initiatives by Oxfam to introduce asymmetrical 
liberalisation measures. In the case of the EU27, the gains are negligible suggesting that 
the Moroccan-US agro-food package is of little cost to the EU. Indeed, on the basis of 
these long run estimates, it would be difficult for EU policy makers to justify 
agricultural liberalisation measures given the political sensitivity of lowering trade 
barriers to foreign competition in these products.  
In contrast, further experiments examining the impact removing Moroccan-EU 
NTB trade costs in agro-food (scenario 2) and all (scenario 3) sectors yields significant 
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real income gains to the Moroccan economy. The removal of agro-food NTB tariff 
equivalents yields per capita real income gains of 3.3% above the long run baseline, 
whilst this result is estimated to climb to 12.2% on removal of all trade costs. 
Interestingly, the model estimates that the potential real income gains from the 
dismantling/harmonisation of all NTB costs with the EU could be $US2.713bn. 
To some extent the magnitude of these gains is to be expected given the size of 
the NTB tariff equivalents extrapolated from the gravity model and ‘additional’ welfare 
enhancing pro-competitive effects from the liberalisation of highly concentrated 
manufacturing industries in scenario 3. However, such results should be regarded as 
upper bound estimates since the dismantling of such costs would realistically apply to 
all Euro-Mediterranean Partnership members thereby diluting (trade diversion) the 
welfare gains to Morocco. Furthermore, it should be noted that a neo-classical long run 
multi-region CGE representation has little to say about the structural challenges (fiscal 
balance, exchange rate volatility, frictional movements in labour) that face Morocco in 
the short to medium term. Indeed, the results of these simulations should be treated with 
caution in that they do not shed light on the degree of welfare distribution or poverty 
alleviation from a modified bilateral deal. Notwithstanding, if the inferred NTB 
estimates from the econometric specification are to be believed, the long term potential 
for trade-led development policies in Morocco of this nature is considerable whether 
they be negotiated within a multilateral or bilateral forum. 
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9. Appendix  
1.1 Values of gravity variables in the composite regions  
 
To calculate distances from a composite to an individual country, arbitrarily a capital city of the 
aggregated area was selected. The selections made are: for North Africa, Tunis in Tunisia; Middle East, 
Riyad in Saudi Arabia; Central America or CACM, Guatemala city (Guatemala); Rest of Andan Pact, 
Quito (Ecuador); Rest of Caribbean, Habana (Cuba); Rest of Free Trade Area of America or CARICOM, 
Kingston (Jamaica); Rest of North America, Juneau (Alaska); Rest of South America, Asunción 
(Paraguay); Rest of the World, Nairobi (Kenya). 
 
To calculate the internal distances of the composites, an average of all the bilateral distances between 
capitals is calculated. In the Rest of the World composite, a country/ capital in each continent has been 
selected, and then, an average of the bilateral distances between these selected countries is calculated. 
These selected capitals (countries) were: Beijing (China) for Asia; Nairobi (Kenya) for Africa; Bern 
(Switzerland) for Europe; and Canberra (Australia) for Oceania. 
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To choose a value for the contiguity (contij) variable when at least one of the countries involved is a 
composite, a value of 1 is assigned if there is a common border either with all the countries within the 
composite or with the country with the highest GDP of the composite. The common language variable 
(langij) when at least one of the trade partners is a composite, takes value 1 when the country shares any 
of the languages spoken by the composite. 
 
The quantitative variables, exports, GDP variables, population (used for per capita indicators) and 
infrastructure indicators, are aggregated across the countries within the composites to calculate the overall 
composite value. The price index for composites, are averages of the individual price indexes across the 
countries involved in the composite. 
 
 
 
1.2 The composition of costs, mark-ups and free entry/exit of firms in imperfectly 
competitive industries. 
 
Due to a lack of data, all firms are assumed symmetric (i.e. the same cost and technology structure and 
face the same demand conditions) and treated as a micro-scaled version of the industry.  
(i) Mark-ups 
In imperfectly competitive industries, each firm possesses market power to mark-up output price (P) over 
marginal cost (MC) leading to short-run profits. A symmetric firm´s profit function is: 
 
 iii TCPQ −=Π       (A1) 
 
where: iΠ is profit; P is industry price; Qi is firm output; and TCi is total costs. The decision to employ 
the Cournot assumption of quantity as a strategic variable was considered to be more appropriate in 
characterising perishable food markets, which are the main focus of this study, whilst Elbehri and Hertel 
(2003) also justify Cournot on the grounds of relatively higher industry concentration and less emphasis 
on firm level product differentiation which relies more on price as a strategic variable. Under Cournot 
assumptions, firms maximise profit subject to output changes, where each symmetric firm conjectures the 
output responses of rivals to changes in its own output. Taking the derivative ( )ii Q∂∂ /π , and 
manipulating the resulting first order conditions gives firm´s mark-up:  
 
 ε
1.
NP
MCPMARKUP iii
Ω=−=     (A2) 
 
iΩ  is the conjectural variation parameter characterising changes in industry output (T) with respect to 
changes in firm output (Qi); N is the number of firms in the industry; multiplied by the absolute value of 
the inverse elasticity of demand for the industry tradable. Under the assumption of symmetry, 1/N is 
equivalent to Qi/T. Thus, we can derive the Cournot conjectural variation elasticity:  
 
 
T
Q
Q
T
N
i
i
i
∂
∂=Ω        (A3) 
 
In this paper, standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used, where Ω has a value of 1. Thus, firm ‘i’ 
believes that all rivals’ outputs remain fixed. Note that the value of N is updated by changes in the 
number of firms entering/leaving the imperfectly competitive industry (see below). Further, the 
differentiation of mark-ups from region ‘r’ across foreign and domestic bilateral routes (‘s’) is a function 
of endogenous changes in the absolute value of the inverse elasticity of domestic (r=s) and foreign (r≠s) 
demand. The aggregate industry mark-up in region ‘r’ is a weighted sales share of each of the bilateral 
sales mark-ups to regions ‘s’ (r=s, r≠s).  
 
(ii) Calibration of firm numbers 
Following Elbehri and Hertel (2003), the Cournot mark-up condition can also be derived as: 
 
  
 
43
ε
H
P
MCP i =−       (A4) 
 
where H is the Herfindahl index of concentration which is the sum of the squared market shares of all n 
firms in the industry, and ε is the inverse elasticity of demand for the industry tradable. Comparing 
equations (A4) and (A2) and assuming a standard Cournot-Nash conjectural variation value (Ω) of 1, 
reveals that H = (1/N). Thus, borrowed Herfindahl concentration data for Morocco (Elbehri and Hertel, 
2003), and extrapolated data for the EU15 and the ROW (Haaland and Tellefsen, 1994) are used to 
calibrate benchmark firm numbers. Since the EU is now a composite of 27 members (rather than 15) and 
the ROW composite does not include EU accession members and the USA, we extrapolate firm numbers 
following Augier and Gasiorek (2000) as the ratio of sector production to firm numbers. In the case of the 
USA, Herfindahl data is taken from the US Census Bureau (2001).    
 
(iii) The structure of costs 
Examining expression (A2), with constant returns to scale in production yielding constant average 
variable costs (equal to marginal costs), and long run zero profits in each imperfectly competitive sector, 
a mark-up of 0.3 implies average variable and fixed cost components constitute 70% and 30% of the 
output price (or average total cost) respectively. Thus, the composite (i.e., domestic and foreign) mark-up 
for each imperfectly competitive sector apportions total fixed and variable costs as fractions of total 
industry costs. 
 
(iv) Entry/exit of firms/varieties 
Long run profit is eliminated through entry/exit of firms (product variants) and is largely a function of (i) 
endogenous mark-up effects and (ii) changes in average fixed (and therefore total) costs due to changes in 
output per firm (scale effects), where (i) and (ii) combined are known as pro-competitive effects. Thus, a 
fall in the mark-up will signal, ceteris paribus, falling profits and therefore an exodus of firms from the 
industry (or vice versa). In linear terms (denoted by lower case letters), industry market clearing is given 
as: 
 
 ririri nqofmqo ,,, +=       (A5) 
 
In the absence of changing industry output (qoi,r), a reduction in firm numbers (ni,r), will signal an 
increase in output per firm (qofmi,r) which is also consistent with the reduction in the mark-up (or vice 
versa). 
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10. Tables 
 
 Trade flows ($US 2001 millions) Bilateral import  tariff 
 (% ad valorem rate) 
 Morocco 
- EU 
EU – 
Morocco 
Sector 
Balance 
Morocco 
 - EU 
EU – 
Morocco 
Crops   62.4 313.9 -251.6   1.4 27.6 
Vegetables,  Fruit & Nuts 399.8   14.1  385.7 11.2 41.8 
Livestock   24.0   15.5     8.5   0.3 30.7 
Other Agriculture   97.0    2.9   94.0   0.0 19.6 
Meat Products   11.0  16.6   -5.6 92.2       151.8 
Vegetable Oils & Fats    1.4  20.8 -19.3 47.5 13.5 
Dairy    2.4  71.9 -69.6 10.9 58.1 
Sugar Processing     9.1    1.1    8.0 11.6 36.5 
Other Food Processing 507.3  72.7 434.5   1.1 34.0 
Beverages & Tobacco     8.1  24.3 -16.2 14.9 24.3 
Agriculture 583.2 346.5 236.7 - - 
Food 539.2 207.4 331.8 - - 
Total Trade    6900.4     7059.6        -159.2 - - 
Table 1: Moroccan – EU27 Trade relations. 
Source GTAP version 6 Beta data. 
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Table 2. Estimation of the gravity equation 
Sector   α gdpi gdpj sqincij Pri Prj Infri Infrj distij Contij Langij Mtj Xsi 2R  Condition Number 
Crops Coefficient -39.419 1.487 1.012 -0.009 -3.168 0.120 0.016 0.282 -0.918 1.311 0.558 0.077 0.073 0.724 80.725 
 std error 1.089 0.026 0.029 0.015 0.195 0.197 0.042 0.045 0.059 0.235 0.163 0.009 0.010   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.577 0.000 0.542 0.699 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000   
Vegetables, fruits and nuts Coefficient -32.744 1.224 0.856 0.002 -2.057 0.694 -0.059 0.400 -0.651 1.510 0.519 0.058 -0.168 0.676 81.782 
 std error 1.055 0.027 0.028 0.018 0.218 0.189 0.044 0.043 0.058 0.237 0.160 0.005 0.075   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.932 0.000 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.026   
Livestock Coefficient -29.116 0.980 1.075 -0.025 -1.548 0.176 0.331 0.162 -0.909 1.473 0.259 0.046 0.474 0.762 80.469 
 std error 0.822 0.023 0.022 0.013 0.176 0.156 0.035 0.036 0.046 0.185 0.123 0.008 0.210   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.024   
Other agricultural productsCoefficient -33.756 0.992 1.037 -0.038 -0.802 0.928 -0.002 0.219 -0.776 1.054 0.585 0.599 77.283 
 std error 1.121 0.037 0.030 0.017 0.261 0.193 0.065 0.044 0.066 0.282 0.183   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.002 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001   
Meat Coefficient -25.669 0.882 0.858 -0.005 0.411 0.410 0.447 0.160 -0.463 2.091 0.851 0.050 -0.012 0.762 80.469 
 std error 0.956 0.025 0.026 0.018 0.184 0.168 0.033 0.040 0.060 0.240 0.163 0.004 0.003   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.772 0.025 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Vegetable oils and fats Coefficient -31.952 1.111 0.926 -0.023 -1.021 -0.082 0.217 0.080 -0.817 1.526 0.384 0.077 -0.064 0.715 82.273 
 std error 1.031 0.026 0.025 0.017 0.160 0.161 0.035 0.036 0.056 0.274 0.176 0.009 0.153   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.611 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.674   
Dairy Coefficient -26.263 0.902 0.926 -0.058 0.209 0.405 0.486 -0.062 -0.696 1.707 0.493 0.029 0.001 0.735 81.405 
 std error 0.940 0.022 0.024 0.014 0.152 0.169 0.029 0.039 0.051 0.232 0.154 0.003 0.005   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.017 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.793   
Sugar Coefficient -32.707 1.111 0.954 -0.071 -1.784 0.141 0.153 0.037 -0.849 1.284 0.373 0.044 0.000 0.661 83.333 
 std error 1.089 0.025 0.028 0.020 0.202 0.188 0.042 0.042 0.063 0.258 0.171 0.004 0.003  
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.454 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.875  
.../cont. 
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Sector  α gdpi gdpj sqincij Pri Prj Infri Infrj distij Contij Langij Mtj Xsi 2R  Condition Number 
Other food products Coefficient -27.587 1.092 0.915 -0.026 -1.253 0.144 -0.015 0.266 -0.853 1.435 1.342 0.028 0.130 0.741 80.885 
 std error 0.823 0.024 0.024 0.013 0.196 0.161 0.044 0.038 0.048 0.166 0.131 0.005 0.032   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.371 0.735 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Beverages and tobacco Coefficient -22.933 0.874 0.780 -0.037 0.295 1.186 0.296 0.227 -0.520 1.362 1.659 0.023 0.556 0.730 80.489 
 std error 0.882 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.175 0.158 0.037 0.036 0.050 0.206 0.140 0.003 0.132   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Raw materials Coefficient -34.542 1.333 1.134 -0.032 -2.132 -0.905 0.126 0.424 -1.037 0.954 0.657 0.080 -0.162 0.727 80.166 
 std error 1.064 0.030 0.028 0.014 0.177 0.189 0.043 0.045 0.057 0.221 0.173 0.021 0.031   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Textiles Coefficient -25.497 1.144 0.977 0.037 -1.029 -0.615 0.245 0.104 -1.435 0.319 0.450 0.013 0.018 0.802 82.766 
 std error 0.778 0.021 0.021 0.014 0.121 0.154 0.029 0.037 0.045 0.167 0.115 0.006 0.008   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.037 0.026   
Wearing apparel Coefficient -24.585 1.080 0.946 0.011 -2.084 0.363 0.105 0.095 -1.261 0.311 0.302 -0.007 -0.027 0.789 82.401 
 std error 0.798 0.021 0.021 0.013 0.127 0.150 0.029 0.034 0.043 0.169 0.120 0.005 0.010   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.065 0.012 0.134 0.010   
Word products Coefficient -23.622 0.971 1.010 0.007 -0.331 0.522 0.388 0.170 -1.274 0.699 0.676 0.024 0.111 0.728 81.249 
 std error 0.971 0.025 0.026 0.016 0.145 0.183 0.032 0.043 0.052 0.200 0.149 0.009 0.021   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.668 0.023 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000   
Paper & publishing Coefficient -26.083 1.034 0.953 -0.011 1.163 -0.348 0.226 0.075 -1.136 1.051 1.002 0.016 0.276 0.816 79.846 
 std error 0.754 0.019 0.019 0.012 0.131 0.136 0.030 0.036 0.044 0.174 0.120 0.007 0.033   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.000   
Chemical products Coefficient -25.558 1.076 1.013 0.008 0.193 -1.262 0.338 0.019 -1.104 0.677 0.995 -0.031 -0.051 0.835 80.473 
 std error 0.665 0.021 0.020 0.011 0.132 0.149 0.038 0.042 0.039 0.144 0.107 0.010 0.015  
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.445 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.643 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001  
.../cont. 
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Sector  α gdpi gdpj sqincij Pri Prj Infri Infrj distij Contij Langij Mtj Xsi 2R  Condition Number 
Metal products Coefficient -29.404 1.203 1.090 0.014 -0.526 -0.205 0.398 -0.003 -1.370 0.713 0.723 0.022 0.049 0.800 80.981 
 std error 0.820 0.024 0.022 0.012 0.148 0.165 0.039 0.046 0.048 0.173 0.124 0.010 0.056   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.941 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.378   
Motor Vehicles Coefficient -30.606 1.215 0.974 -0.005 0.753 0.439 0.270 0.078 -1.141 0.783 0.460 0.039 0.238 0.769 80.649 
 std error 0.918 0.025 0.027 0.012 0.163 0.181 0.039 0.047 0.054 0.188 0.135 0.008 0.055   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.674 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000   
Light manufacturing Coefficient -25.965 1.131 1.023 0.032 0.717 -0.636 0.443 0.144 -1.248 0.353 0.822 0.036 -0.050 0.820 79.584 
 std error 0.762 0.021 0.023 0.013 0.130 0.158 0.034 0.046 0.044 0.163 0.115 0.012 0.023   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.003 0.031   
Other manufactures Coefficient -30.730 1.092 1.005 0.018 0.339 0.129 0.230 0.083 -0.979 0.538 0.862 0.010 0.129 0.816 81.743 
 std error 0.751 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.128 0.149 0.031 0.035 0.042 0.152 0.108 0.007 0.032   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.115 0.008 0.389 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.145 0.000   
Utilities Coefficient -17.999 0.634 0.949 -0.040 -0.396 -0.073 0.503 0.441 -0.474 1.051 -0.786 0.611 76.761 
 std error 1.046 0.026 0.026 0.016 0.150 0.155 0.032 0.035 0.057 0.278 0.136   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.640 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Services Coefficient -22.784 0.804 0.877 -0.004 0.559 0.473 0.213 0.153 -0.162 -0.339 -0.104 0.933 76.757 
 std error 0.317 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.051 0.051 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.069 0.051   
 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042   
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Importer Exporter Crops 
Vegetables, 
fruits and 
nuts 
Livestock 
Other 
agricultural 
products 
Meat 
Vegetable 
oils and fats
Dairy Sugar 
Other food 
products 
Beverages 
and tobacco
Raw 
materials 
Morocco EU15 12.2 93.7 113.1 28.3 52.5 22.6 19.0 92.6 83.0 297.8 26.5 
Morocco EU12 0 164.9 267.5 140.5 47.7 78.1 10.1 108.9 91.4 357.1 0 
Eu15 Morocco 22.8 0 59.0 0 55.0 143.5 60.2 29.1 11.3 403.0 20.1 
EU12 Morocco 34.9 0 64.2 11.5 142.2 58.1 50.3 32.0 49.6 730.4 2.4 
EU15 EU12 48.6 115.5 150.2 93.6 29.3 83.9 54.9 134.1 99.1 242.7 26.1 
EU12 EU15 94.2 53.1 141.1 56.8 31.6 35.1 62.6 102.2 89.0 314.3 30.3 
 
Importer Exporter Textil 
Wearing 
appliances
Wood Paper Chemical Metal Motor 
Light 
manufacturing
Other 
manufactures
Utilities Services 
Morocco EU15 0.9 5.0 35.1 34.4 22.2 23.3 56.6 18.4 35.4 67.1 56.7 
Morocco EU12 42.4 47.1 9.2 17.1 28.8 9.9 44.7 21.1 52.5 106.2 55.6 
Eu15 Morocco 1.6 0 17.9 2.0 12.8 21.6 31.9 5.8 25.3 144.3 18.2 
EU12 Morocco 16.0 16.6 50.3 28.8 54.4 51.8 34.9 4.5 40.6 161.0 24.2 
EU15 EU12 29.4 24.4 24.2 21.2 29.0 25.7 21.0 10.2 32.4 70.9 37.7 
EU12 EU15 24.3 21.8 41.0 31.9 25.4 24.7 46.1 20.8 37.9 62.1 40.1 
Table 3. NTB’s tariff-equivalents 
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 Trade bal. ($US 2001 
millions) 
Percentage changes in domestic market sectors. 
 2001  
Benchmark 
change Sales Prod. Output per 
firm 
Markup 
 
Firms 
Crops -832.5 -247.9 -4.2 -4.0 - - - 
Veget. & Fruit 460.3 51.9 0.4 3.6 - - - 
Livestock 21.8 -14.4 1.4 1.4 - - - 
Other Agric. 99.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 - - - 
Meat Prod. -20.1 155.7 -64.6 159.1 114.9 -66.3 44.2 
Veg. Oils & Fats -140.0 13.9 3.1 10.8 8.9 -5.8 1.9 
Dairy -64.8 -67.9 -21.1 -17.7 -0.4 1.4 -17.3 
Sugar Prod. -48.8 3.5 0.6 0.8 1.3 0.5 -0.5 
Oth. Food Prod. 734.3 -19.3 -0.7 -0.4 -1.1 0.1  0.7 
Bev. & Tobac. -63.6  1.5  0.1  0.1  0.7 0.4 -0.6 
Agriculture -251.1 -210.6 -0.8 -0.1 - - - 
Food Prod. 397.0 387.4 -1.8 7.4 - - - 
Total -331.0 -7.5 - - - - - 
Table 4: Experiment 1: Estimated Impacts on Morocco from  
Agro-food FTA compared with the baseline. 
 
 Scenario 1:  
Agric tariff  
removal 
Scenario 2:  
Remove all Agricultural 
tariffs and NTBs  
Scenario 3:   
Remove all Agricultural 
tariffs and all NTBs 
 Morocco EU27 Morocco EU27 Morocco EU27 
EV 67.0 233.5 1581.3 2897.8 5944.8 3547.8 
EV (%  of national income) 0.14 0.00 3.30 0.03 12.23 0.04 
Decomposition:       
Allocative efficiency 45.0 184.0 283.3 2656.0 950.0 2298.6 
Terms of Trade 8.5 52.5 728.6 -478.2 769.3 -90.0 
Pro-competitive Effects 4.1 -7.6 -43.0 84.8 754.1 -2.4 
Of which:       
               Food sectors 11.3 -1.8 163.1 -41.1 225.8 -31.0 
               Non food sectors -7.2 -5.7 -206.1 125.9 528.3 28.6 
Trade costs  0.0 -7.0 458.2 639.1 2713.4 1365.2 
Projections costs 9.4 11.6 154.2 -3.9 758.0 -23.6 
Table 5: Aggregate Welfare Impacts on Morocco from  
Agro-food FTA compared with the baseline. 
 
 

